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Introduction
The study of the correlations between different classes of securities is fundamental to asset pricing. The recent economic literature has examined the issue of whether or not the observed degree of comovement is "excessive." While the roots of this debate trace back to the early research in portfolio theory, the more precise notions of excess comovement are more recent.
This debate has been especially relevant in the extensive literature dealing with financial crises and the propagation of shocks across different markets. 1 The affected markets can be either markets in different countries or markets for different securities in one country. In many of these papers excess correlation is used as the definition of financial contagion. The literature then analyzes whether observed increases in correlation are due to factors like the irrational propagation of financial shocks or merely the increase in the variance of a common factor driving returns in the affected markets.
In this paper we empirically address these issues by analyzing the time series of stock index returns in U.S. markets over the period 1973 to 2001. Rather than using current and past values of macroeconomic variables (as is done, for example, in Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) and Bekaert et al. (2002) ), we use the factor portfolios suggested by Fama and French (1993) and a set of sector groupings to account for the correlation between these indexes due to "common factors," i.e., to existing interdependence. We then use the term contagion to refer to covariation above this level.
More specifically, we define excess correlation as the correlation of the estimated residuals from univariate (OLS) and joint (FGLS) regressions of industry returns on these common factors. While Pindyck and Rotemberg only analyze industries ex ante characterized as unrelated, we analyze all major industry groups for which data are available over the selected sample period (82 in total). The industry correlations are estimated on a rolling annual basis to mitigate problems with the non-stationarity of our data over this long time interval. Finally, departing again from Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) , we attempt to relate the level of excess correlation to market (and sector) returns and volatility, market momentum, market (and sector) trends, fluctuations in the interest rates, and seasonality effects.
Briefly stated, our key findings are as follows. The average excess comovement across our entire sample, measured by the absolute correlation of regression residuals, is very high (a lower bound of 0.134 and an upper bound of 0.357) and represents a significant portion of the absolute correlation estimated from the raw return series (between 31% and 83%). Furthermore, this excess comovement is highly pervasive: the average excess correlation is significantly different from zero across all of our industry groups. Our measures of excess absolute unconditional correlation are also generally symmetric, i.e., associated with both bull and bear markets, and do not display any significant relation with levels of market returns or proxies for market momentum.
Excess comovement is, however, positively related to market volatility and, when computed using OLS residuals, negatively related to the level of the short-term interest rate. This evidence offers little or no support for liquidity-based theories of financial contagion (such as Calvo (1999) , Yuan (2000) , and Kyle and Xiong (2001) ), but is consistent with models interpreting excess comovement as a symmetric phenomenon due to the portfolio rebalancing activity of investors (e.g., Kodres and Pritsker (2002) and Pasquariello (2002) ).
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the relevant economic literature on excess comovement. Section 3 develops our econometric approach to estimating excess comovement. Section 4 describes the dataset employed in the analysis. Section 5 summarizes our estimation results. Section 6 tests for the significance of many of the proposed explanations for excess comovement mentioned in Section 2. Section 7 contains our conclusions.
Literature background
There are two basic strands of literature that are relevant to our paper. The first deals with the excess comovement hypothesis (ECM), which is the notion that there is comovement in asset prices beyond that which could be explained by common factors such as inflation, aggregate demand, foreign exchange or interest rates. This excess comovement is often attributed to herding behavior on the part of market participants.
Studying seven "largely unrelated" commodities, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) demonstrate that there is excess comovement among them even after correcting for forecasts of aggregate production and inflation. 2 They suggest that the excess comovement in commodity prices could arise from two sources. The first is liquidity constraints: falling prices in one commodity lead to declines in others because investors who are long in several commodities have to liquidate their positions. This argument, known in the literature as the "correlated liquidity shock channel," has been employed by Calvo (1999) , Yuan (2000) , and Kyle and Xiong (2001) to explain events of international financial contagion. The alternative is some form of irrational herding behavior or sunspot equilibria, as in Masson (1998) . This failure to reject the ECM has been somewhat controversial. For example, Deb et al. (1996) , noting that commodity prices have time-varying second moments, suggest the adoption of multivariate GARCH specifications of commodity price changes. Using a slightly different set of commodities and a more recent time-frame, 3 they find no evidence of ECM when using multivariate GARCH models, but some evidence of ECM when using a univariate GARCH specification.
Closer in spirit to our paper is the paper by Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) , which tests for excess comovement across unrelated industry groups. This study builds on the factor analysis of Meyers (1973) . Meyers shows that there are components in the correlation structure beyond industry factors and notes:
"If these components represent some persistent significant source of interdependence among stock prices, then they, rather than industry factors, represent a limitation of the validity of the market model."
Pindyck and Rotemberg classify two industry groups as unrelated if they operate in different business lines and if their earnings (normalized by nominal GNP to capture macro effects) are uncorrelated. Comovement thus arises from shocks to current and expected macroeconomic factors. They use a multiple-indicator, multiple-cause model, to regress industry returns on 2 Commodities are there defined as fundamentally unrelated when their cross-price elasticities of demand and supply are insignificant. The commodities studied by Pindyck and Rotemberg are not substitutes nor complements of each other and are not grown in similar climates. 3 Pindyck and Rotemberg (1999) employ data from 1960 to 1985, while the database of Deb et al. (1996) ranges from 1974 to 1992. contemporaneous, lagged, and forecast values of macroeconomic variables, and estimate the correlations of the resulting residuals. 4 As in their previous study of commodity prices, they find evidence of excess correlation, but attribute it to herding and market segmentation, in particular to the holding of stocks by institutions.
The other major strand of the debate on excess comovement has analyzed financial crises and contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) take significant increases in cross-market correlations as their definition of contagion. They show that the standard tests of cross-market correlations are biased and inaccurate. Based on this argument, they then claim that the Asian crisis was largely a manifestation of natural dependencies among these markets rather than a contagion story. A contrary argument is developed in Corsetti et al. (2002) . They suggest that the results of Forbes and Rigobon are highly dependent on their specification of idiosyncratic shocks. When these shocks are accounted for, Corsetti et al. show significant evidence of contagion during the Asian crisis.
Information asymmetries among traders and portfolio rebalancing by insiders have also been related to financial contagion. King and Wadhwani (1990) were the first to observe that information asymmetry may lead uninformed investors to incorrect revision of their beliefs about the liquidation value of many assets following idiosyncratic shocks to a single asset. Consistent with the intuition of Fleming et al. (1998) , Kodres and Pritsker (2002) show that cross-market rebalancing motivated by risk-aversion may induce excess comovement in a classic mean-variance competitive setting with information asymmetry à la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) .
A different approach is presented in Pasquariello (2002) . This paper develops a Kyle (1985) -type model of financial markets in which the heterogeneous beliefs of imperfectly competitive investors can lead to comovement of assets in markets that are "fundamentally unrelated," i.e., whose underlying fundamentals are independent. The investors in this model are risk neutral and unconstrained financially so that risk aversion and liquidity trading do not affect the results. This model suggests that increasing diversity in private information can lead to greater likelihood and intensity of financial contagion.
A recent paper that presents a further alternative viewpoint is Barberis 4 Latent variables are employed in these regressions to model future GNP growth and inflation.
et al. (2002) . Rather than attribute comovement only to fluctuations in the underlying fundamental factors, they analyze the degree to which investor trading patterns cause groups of securities to comove. They attribute this comovement either to the propensity of investors to group assets into differing categories treated more or less as homogeneous groups (similarly to the argument presented in Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) ), or to the fact that certain investors elect to trade only in a subset of all available investments, i.e., into a specific habitat. Using S&P500 index realignments, they find significant evidence that these trading theories can help explain shifts in beta coefficients, hence stock comovements.
A final view of comovement comes from analyzing the dynamics of related assets trading in different countries, as in Hardouvelis et al. (1994) and Bodurtha et al. (1995) . These papers present significant empirical evidence that closed-end country funds trading in countries different from the country of the asset holdings are as correlated with the trading country's equity index as with the equity index of the traded asset's country. 5 3 Measuring excess covariance
The basic estimation strategy
An intense debate in the literature centers on the problem of identifying and measuring international financial contagion. Nonetheless, a consensus has appeared among researchers that not only periods of uncertainty but also more tranquil times are generally accompanied by excess comovement among asset prices within and across both developed and emerging financial markets. We define such excess comovement as comovement beyond the degree that is justified by economic fundamentals, and financial contagion as the circumstance of its occurrence.
In this section we propose a simple measure of the degree of intertemporal excess comovement among a set of K asset prices. The starting point of the analysis is the specification of a multi-factor model of each asset's return with time-varying sensitivities. Let r kt be a N × 1 vector of returns for asset k over the interval [t − ∆, t], with N = ∆ + 1. We assume that, for each asset k = 1, . . . , K, the return r kt is characterized by the following linear factor structure:
where u bt is a N × N u matrix of systematic sources of risk affecting specific subsets, or blocks of assets (i.e., k ∈ b), e.g., because of the category or habitat considerations mentioned in Section 2, f t is a N × N f vector of systematic shocks affecting more than one block of assets, e kt is a N × 1 vector of idiosyncratic sources of risk (hence, independent from any other e nt ), and β kt and γ kt are (N u × 1 and N f × 1, respectively) vectors of factor loadings. In this setting, comovement between any pairs of returns r k and r n is deemed excessive if, even after controlling for u and f , those returns are still correlated. Measurement of such degree of comovement, if any, at each point in time t requires the estimation of Eq. (1), using sample data for the period [0, T ]. The first estimation strategy we adopt in this paper is to regress the available time series of returns on a chosen set of block-common and systematic factors by ordinary least squares (OLS) and to use the resulting estimated residuals b e OLS kt , where
to compute, for each k 6 = n, excess correlation coefficients
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have shown that correlation coefficients like those in Eqs. (3) are conditional on market volatility, hence that, due to heteroskedasticity, tests for contagion based on such coefficients may be biased toward rejection of the null hypothesis of no excessive comovement among asset returns. The bias can however be corrected, Forbes and Rigobon argue, and an unconditional correlation measure can be computed, if bivariate normality and stable long-term volatility are assumed for any pair of return variables. The measure of excess comovement between r kt and r nt that we adopt in this paper is based on their proposed adjustment and is given by 
for any k = 1, . . . , K. Eq. (5) implies that there is excess comovement for asset k if b ρ OLS * kt is different from zero. Finally, we compute a marketwide measure of financial contagion as a mean of means of excess correlation coefficients across all the traded assets, i.e.,
We want to evaluate the evolution of such measures over time, while accounting for the dynamics of the fundamental interdependence among asset returns. Parametric ARCH and stochastic volatility models, as well as their generalizations to multivariate settings are frequently employed to describe such dynamics. 6 Nonetheless, these models are in general very difficult to 
In other terms, at each point in time t and for each asset k, the model of Eq. (1) , that we use in our analysis, without recurring to parametric specifications for the intertemporal dynamics of the covariance matrix of asset returns. OLS estimation of the model of Eq. (1) for each asset separately may however lead to underestimate the degree of excess covariance across those assets. To overcome this difficulty, a more involved model may be needed. This is the topic of the next subsection.
Latent comovement
In the estimation approach just described, return residuals are estimated separately for each of the available assets via OLS. Therefore, this approach operates under the implicit null hypothesis that the returns r kt , after controlling for block-common and systematic sources of risk, are indeed independent. This strategy may however lead to underestimating the extent of excess comovement among those e kt . In this subsection, we propose an alternative estimation strategy that instead uses as its starting point the hypothesis that return residuals do comove beyond what is justified by the economic fundamentals u b and f, rather than ignoring that possibility.
The basic intuition of this strategy is to estimate the residuals for each asset k jointly, rather than separately. We start by specifying the following stacked version of the model of Eq. (1) 
. . .
where F kt = [u bt , f t ] is a N × M matrix of block-common and systematic factors affecting r kt , with
factor loadings, and where O is a zero matrix. We further assume that the idiosyncratic shocks e kt are uncorrelated across assets, i.e., that E [e kt e 0 ns ] = σ knt I (where I is a N × N identity matrix) if t = s and E [e kt e 0 ns ] = O otherwise. This implies that
The above disturbance formulation therefore allows for the parameters controlling for the subsample covariance across assets to vary over time. Efficient estimation of the seemingly unrelated regressions model of Eq. (9) is achieved via the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) procedure, described, for example, in Greene (1997, pp. 676-688) . Because the matrix Σ t is unknown, OLS residuals can be used to estimate each of its elements consistently as:
The FGLS estimator of B t is then given by (14) where
are then used to produce an efficient estimate of each element of the matrix Σ t ,
Finally, the matrix b Σ
F GLS t
is employed to estimate our measure of excess comovement
where
is repeated for all k = 1, . . . , K and for each t = g∆, . . . , T , as in the rolling approach of Eq. (7), to generate alternative time series of excess comovement measures
Data
The basic dataset we use in this paper consists of weekly, continuously compounded, dividend-adjusted returns for k = 1, . . . , 96 value-weighted U.S. industry indexes (r kt ), over the time period January 2, 1973 to December 31, 2001 , from Datastream. Datastream classifies approximately 1,000 representative companies whose common stocks are traded on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE by industry based uniquely on their primary activity. Equities with similar industrial classification are then grouped into i = 1, . . . , 10 sectors (r it ). Finally, Datastream also computes returns for s = 1, 2, 3 macro-sector indexes r st (Resources, Non Financials excluding Resources, and Financials) and for a broad market index of all sectors (r mt ). Industry and sector classifications are performed according to definitions provided by the FTSE Actuaries.
The choice of the weekly frequency for our database arises from a balance between computer capability and properties of the available time series. The use of daily equity data in fact raises concerns related to the possibility of biases induced by infrequent and/or nonsynchronous trading, or short-term noise on the resulting statistical inference. Vice versa, monthly observations may lead us to ignore the relatively more rapid cycles of propagation of shocks across fundamentally unrelated returns that appear to plague the U.S. stock market.
The companies entering each index are selected on the basis of their market capitalization and data availability considerations. Factors like liquidity or cross-holdings are therefore ignored. Datastream also excludes from those indexes such securities as unit trusts, mutual and investment funds, foreign listings (including ADRs). Index constituents are reviewed on an annual basis (in January of each year) to account for declines in market value, takeovers, delistings, changes in the primary business activity, etc. 7 We further eliminate from our dataset 14 industry indexes for which price data were available only for subsets of the sample period. Our final dataset is then made of 82 industry, 10 sector, 3 macro-sector, and 1 market return time series of 1,512 observations each, that we use in the analysis that follows. Table 1 presents summary statistics for r mt , for each r st , and for each r it . Not surprisingly, given the growth experienced by the U.S. stock market in the past three decades, most mean weekly returns are positive and significant. 7 Prior to May 1995, indices were instead reviewed every three months.
The variables are also characterized by little or no skewness and strong and significant leptokurtosis. Index aggregation seems to induce negative return autocorrelation; indeed, the estimated first order autocorrelation coefficients b ρ 1 are not significantly different from zero for many of the sector returns and the corresponding value for the Ljung-Box portmanteau test for up to the fifth-order serial correlation, LB (5), cannot reject the null hypothesis that those r it are white noise. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the autocorrelation analysis of each of the 82 industry return time series r kt (not reported here). Both b ρ 1 and LB (5) are instead statistically significant for the market and for all but the Financials macro-sector returns.
5 Empirical analysis
Factor selection
Estimation of Eq. (1) and the seemingly unrelated regression model of Eq. (9) requires the selection of block-common and systematic factors for industry returns. This is a crucial step in our analysis. Indeed, the test for excess comovement is unavoidably also a test of the validity of the specification we use to control for fundamental comovement, i.e., to compute b ρ OLS * knt and b ρ F GLS * knt at each point in time t. The challenge is therefore to design a model that is both comprehensive in its scope and general in its structure.
We start from the variables entering the matrix f t in Eq. (1). French (1992, 1993) find that three systematic factors explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional difference in average stock returns. These factors are market risk, book-to-market risk and small-firm risk. We use these benchmark factors in our regressions. We employ the all-inclusive time series of returns for the market designed by Datastream, r mt , to proxy for market risk. Fama and French create mimicking portfolios whose returns proxy for book-to-market risk and small-firm risk. A time series for the former is generated by subtracting the average return of two growth portfolios (consisting of firms with low book-to-market ratios) from the average return of two value portfolios (consisting of firms with high book-to-market ratios). A time series for the latter is generated by subtracting the average return of three "big" portfolios (consisting of firms with high market capitalization) from the average return of three "small" portfolios (consisting of firms with low market capitalization). Fama and French (1995) show that both variables are related to economic fundamentals controlling for common risk factors in returns. More specifically, the book-to-market ratio is negatively related with current earnings and positively related to their persistence. Size appears instead to be negatively related to short-and long-term profitability. In the analysis that follows, we use the time series for book-to-market benchmark returns, r BMt , and small-firm benchmark returns, r SF t , available on French's research website. 8 Sector-or macro-sector-specific sources of risk may also explain some of the correlation between our indexes. This correlation may in fact be due not only to market-level factors but also to sector-level sources of risk in cash flow innovations. In addition, stocks (and industry indexes) may be traded together when they are perceived to belong to the same category or subset, as maintained, for example, by Barberis et al. (2002) . This argument is especially relevant when we consider that the performance of many mutual fund managers is evaluated by comparison with broad sector indexes. It is not surprising therefore that such benchmarks explain at least part of their portfolio allocation decisions across assets. Hence, the inclusion of an industry index in a specific sector group may affect the comovement of that index with the rest of the market. We account for these effects by specifying a set of block-common factors for each return series r kt . More specifically, for each of the 82 available indexes, we identify two benchmark sector-and macro-sector-portfolios, according to the Datastream industrial classification levels, and use their corresponding weighted average returns, r it and r st , respectively, in each of the matrices u b . For example, returns for the broad category portfolios General Industrials (r it ) and Non-Financials (r st ) are used for the Aerospace industry index k, where k ∈ i and k ∈ s.
The final specification of Eq. (1), which we use to control for return covariance driven by fundamentals, is therefore given by
for each k = 1, . . . , K. Testing for excess comovement and explaining the intertemporal and cross-sectional features of the resulting measures described in Section 3,
, and other such aggregates is what we do next.
OLS and FGLS comovement
We start by estimating the model of Eq. (18) over the sample interval January 2, 1973 to December 31, 2001 for all indexes in our database using both the OLS and FGLS procedures. We then use the corresponding estimated residuals to compute the unconditional measures of excess comovement described in Section 3.1 across rolling intervals of about one year (∆ = 50). The correction suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) (reported in Eq. (4)) is implemented by estimating long-term variances for the corresponding variables over a two-year interval (g = 2). We plot the resulting time series As previously mentioned, underlying the OLS procedure is the null hypothesis that index returns r kt , after controlling for sector and systematic sources of risk, are independent, for return residuals are estimated separately (via OLS) for each k. Vice versa, underlying the FGLS procedure is the alternative hypothesis that index returns r kt do comove beyond the degree justified by sector and systematic factors, as return residuals are estimated jointly (via FGLS) for all k. Because the OLS strategy ignores the possibility that return disturbances e kt are correlated across securities, the time series b ρ OLS * t may underestimate the intensity of comovement beyond fundamentals. The FGLS strategy obviates to this problem. This approach, however, may also capture latent comovement induced by missing common fundamental factors, if the model of Eq. (18) Table 2 ).
Excess comovement also fluctuates over time, especially b ρ Table 2 . There is little cross-sectional variability in our estimates for the lower bound on excess absolute correlation. Greater sector variation instead characterizes the corresponding upper bound estimates. The sector with the highest mean excess correlation is General Industrials (from Aerospace to Engineering General ), with an average b ρ 
Explaining excess comovement
Based on the evidence presented in the previous section, we conclude that a significant portion of return comovement across industry indexes in the U.S. stock market in the past three decades cannot be explained by sector or systematic factors. We also found that our measures of excess absolute correlation display significant intertemporal but little cross-sectional variation, except when relative to their benchmarks. Perhaps more interestingly, Figure 1a further shows that absolute raw correlation is lower in the past decade than in the previous twenty years (a statistically significant difference in means of ten basis points, i.e., 0.376 versus an average of 0.476 for the 1970s and the 1980s), while our lower bound estimate of excess comovement is relatively stable (0.134 over both time-frames) and the upper bound measure drops by less than six basis points by the end of the sample (0.383 versus 0.324). Campbell et al. (2001) have argued that this decline in raw correlations may be due to a general decline in the correlation of stock fundamentals. Figure 1b suggests that non-fundamental comovement played a crucial role in affecting levels and fluctuations of the correlations among stock indexes during the 1990s and the early 2000s, ranging between 38% and 85% of b ρ BASE * t . Understanding these phenomena represents therefore one of the priorities for research in financial economics. In Section 2 we have briefly overviewed the major explanations proposed by the literature. In the remainder of the paper, we tackle the task of ascertaining the empirical relevance of some of those explanations using our measures of excess absolute correlation b ρ OLS * t and b ρ F GLS * t . As previously mentioned, any test for excess comovement based on conditional measures of correlation that does not account for shifts in volatility is biased toward acceptance of the alternative hypothesis of financial contagion (see Forbes and Rigobon (2002) ). Corsetti et al. (2002) further observe that ignoring fluctuations in asset-specific factors may instead make tests for contagion biased toward rejection. In the analysis of Sections 3 and 5, we controlled for these considerations by estimating unconditional correlations with the adjustment suggested by Forbes and Rigobon, but computed such adjustment using long-term return volatility for each of the paired returns, in order to allow for the possibility of a shift in volatility regime across any pair of index returns. These corrections allow us to relate our time series of excess absolute correlation to market (or sector) volatility and returns.
Information asymmetry has long been suggested as a cause of comovement across asset prices beyond what would be justified by their fundamentals (e.g., King and Wadhwani (1990) and, more recently, Kodres and Pritsker (2002) ). In this branch of the literature, the inability to distinguish between idiosyncratic and systematic shocks to those fundamentals leads prices to move together regardless of the underlying structure of the economy. Pasquariello (2002) adds a new perspective to this issue by arguing that greater heterogeneity of information endowments among insiders may increase the intensity of excess comovement across returns. We can interpret market (sector) return volatility as a proxy for both the level of confusion and uncertainty existing in a market (or sector) and the degree of diversity and disagreement among investors with respect to the value of the traded assets. Indeed, in Pasquariello (2002) , greater information heterogeneity makes equilibrium asset prices more volatile as well. Momentum trading (e.g., De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) , and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) is another potential explanation for excess comovement. Generalized purchases or sales of assets across sectors or industries, motivated either by imitation, injections and redemptions of cash in mutual funds, by the activity of momentum fund managers, or by rational or irrational bubbles, may indeed link prices of assets otherwise sharing very little in common with each other.
We test for the validity of these arguments by regressing both measures of absolute correlation b ρ OLS * t and b ρ F GLS * t (and each b ρ
OLS * it
and b ρ F GLS * it for i = 1, . . . , 10) on two proxies for market (sector) volatility and momentum, σ mt (or σ it ) and M t , respectively. σ mt (σ st ) is market (sector) return volatility computed over the interval [t − g∆, t]. The time series M t , provided by French in his research website, is constructed by first forming six value-weighted portfolios on size and prior returns and then computing the difference between the average return on the two high prior return portfolios and the average return on the two low prior return portfolios. Because this series is available only at a monthly frequency, we also consider two additional proxies for momentum. The first is simply the sequence of contemporaneous and lagged returns r mt−l (or r ti−l ), for l = 0, 1, 2. We also construct momentum dummy variables d mt and d it . These variables are equal to 1 when the sign of the corresponding return r mt or r it is the same for the current and each of the previous two weeks, and equal to zero otherwise. In other words, these dummies are positive when either the broad stock market index or the corresponding sector index is experiencing a positive or negative run for the length of (at least) three weeks.
We report our results in Tables 3 and 5 . After controlling for market volatility, momentum has no explanatory power, nor do contemporaneous and lagged returns. Interestingly, the coefficient for the dummy for existing market trend is also positive and significant in the regression for the lower bound measure, suggesting that, during market upturns and downturns, basic non-fundamental forces drive returns of stock indexes regardless of their underlying fundamentals.
At the sector level, the evidence is very similar. Yet, the explanatory power of σ it for b ρ OLS * t and b ρ . A dichotomy between OLS and FGLS excess comovement however arises when sector performance dummies are introduced. Indeed, the coefficients for d it are mostly positive and only twice significant in the lower bound regressions of Table 4 . There instead appears to be a generally negative, and in some cases statistically significant, relationship between upper bound estimates of excess comovement at the sector level and short-term trends in the corresponding indexes. Moreover, coefficients for d it are in most cases of greater absolute magnitude for b ρ F GLS * it than for b ρ
. This evidence suggests that protracted runs in sector returns tend to decrease the degree of sector-wide excess comovement, contrary to the market-wide results reported in Tables 3 and 5 .
To account for the possibility that the intensity of excess comovement may be greater during a bear market or a correction, as it is often argued in some empirical and theoretical literature on financial contagion across international stock markets, 9 we devise additional sets of dummy measures d Tables 3 to 6 , we however find that many of the corresponding coefficients are not statistically different from zero. Therefore, allowing for asymmetric impacts of bull and bear markets on b ρ * mt and b ρ * it does not increase the explanatory power of those regressions, nor does it have any economically significant impact on it. In addition, the lower bounds on excess comovement mostly increase during bull markets, while the corresponding upper bounds decline especially during bear markets.
In his empirical analysis of comovement between real stock prices in the U.S. and the U.K., Shiller (1989) finds that a relevant portion of price covariance exceeding that of fundamentals can be explained by time-varying interest rates. According to Shiller, the extreme variability and strong positive autocorrelation characterizing the interest rate series in both countries justify their substantial cumulated impact on the actual values of the traded assets, whose expectations enter observed market prices. More recently, two different theories of financial contagion suggest that the domestic risk-free rate may indeed affect the magnitude of financial contagion within and across markets. Calvo (1999) , Yuan (2000) , and Kyle and Xiong (2001) maintain that short-selling, borrowing, and wealth constraints induce rational speculators to liquidate fundamentally unrelated assets in response to idiosyncratic shocks. When interest rates are high or when the stock market is experiencing a downturn, it is reasonable to imagine that the above financial constraints would be generally more binding for investors, hence that more across-the-board sales would take place regardless of fundamentals. Therefore, we should expect greater excess comovement when interest rates are high and/or during a bearish market.
Alternatively, Fleming et al. (1998) , Kodres and Pritsker (2002) , and Pasquariello (2002) emphasize how portfolio rebalancing activity by insiders, motivated either by risk considerations or strategic motives, may eventually lead equilibrium asset prices to move together beyond the degree justified by underlying systematic factors, but in a symmetric fashion. Along these lines, any variable affecting the costs of rebalancing (transaction fees, bidask spreads, and interest rates) should have an impact on the intensity of financial contagion, insofar as it affects the intensity of such rebalancing activity. Higher interest rates increase the opportunity cost of trading in risky assets, the cost of borrowing and shorting, so should reduce the scope of portfolio rebalancing for investors and of the resulting excess comovement.
To ascertain the relevance of these considerations, we regress our measures of excess absolute correlation on the most significant explanatory variable so far, the corresponding return volatility σ mt and σ it , and a proxy for the timevarying risk-free rate r F t , a weekly time series of three-month Treasury Bill rates. These rates are computed as averages of bid rates quoted by primary dealers in the secondary market and reported to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the official close of the U.S. government securities market every business day, and are available on the website of the Federal Reserve Board. 10 Interestingly, the risk-free rate and market volatility are almost uncorrelated (displaying a correlation of 0.05 over the entire sample interval). Thus, we are not concerned about multicollinearity issues in the analysis that follows.
The results of these regressions are reported in the last rows of Tables 3  and 5 is negative and significant in most cases, with the exception of the Information Technology index. Hence, higher interest rates tend to reduce the lower bounds on the degree of excess comovement in the U.S. stock market. Yet, the evidence for the corresponding upper bounds is at best inconclusive: interest rates do not impact b ρ F GLS * t in a statistically significant fashion, but raise, rather than reduce, non-fundamental comovement for five of the ten sectors listed in Table 1 . In most of these circumstances, however, r F t does not induce economically significant gains in the explanatory power of the regression including only σ it . On the contrary, both σ it and r F t improve dramatically the explanatory power of the regressions in Table 4 , especially for the Financials (from Banks to Other Financials) and Resources sectors. Nonetheless, cross-sectional variation in the estimated coefficients for r F t in Tables 4 and 6 again confirm the existence of strong cross-sector variation in the excess comovement phenomenon.
Market volatility and short-term interest rates instead jointly explain almost 36% of the fluctuations of b ρ OLS * t , albeit still not its average levels, for the constant coefficient (0.131) is highly significant and close to the sample mean b ρ OLS * t of 0.134 (in Table 2 ). Vice versa, the risk-free rate raises the adjusted R 2 in the regression of σ mt and r F t on b ρ F GLS * t , but the constant term drops to 0.213 and is lower than b ρ F GLS * t (equal to 0.357 in Table 2) . We have previously shown that our measure of excess comovement is also broadly symmetric. This evidence and the above findings offer little or no support for the correlated liquidity shock channel, but are consistent with the implications of the symmetric portfolio rebalancing theories of contagion.
Finally, we test for the possibility that the turn-of-the-year effect of Banz (1981), Blume and Stambaugh (1983) , Keim (1983) , and Roll (1983) may also contribute to the excess comovement observed among equity indexes. There is strong evidence that stocks with small market capitalization tend to outperform stocks with large market capitalization between the end of December and the beginning of January, with the excess return progressively decreasing by the end of the month. Keim (1989) argues that closing prices recorded at the bid in December and at the ask in January may represent an albeit partial explanation of such phenomenon. Yet, its most popular interpretations rely on the activity of investors attempting to realize a fiscal gain by selling stocks that have already declined during the year, before buying them back in January (Roll (1983) ) or parking the proceeds of such sales which were not immediately reinvested (Ritter (1988) ).
In any case, the resulting trading activity of individual and institutional investors selling first and buying later according to their portfolio compositions may drive upward the return comovement of the stocks sold and bought. If that is the case, we should expect our correlation measure to be significantly higher either in December or in January, or in both months than during the rest of the year. In Table 7 we test for this hypothesis by computing t-statistics for the paired differences between lower and upper bounds on the excess comovement measures (in Panels A and B, respectively) from February to November and those in either December or January, under the assumptions that the paired differences are independent and normally distributed, with the same mean and either equal or unequal variance. The same analysis is repeated for the benchmark b ρ BASE * t , in Panel C. The results reported in Table 7 reject the hypothesis that the turn-of-the-year effect has any impact on excess and raw comovement: indeed, in each circumstance, none of the corresponding t-statistics is statistically different from zero.
In brief, market (and sector) volatility and the short-term risk-free interest rate alone contribute to about 36% and 22% of the fluctuations in our estimates for the lower and upper bounds on excess absolute correlation, respectively. Nevertheless, the positive and strongly significant constant terms in all of the above regressions of Tables 3 to 6 and the disappointing results of momentum, contemporaneous and lagged returns, market trends, and the turn-of-the-year effect suggest that much more of the excess comovement we find in the U.S. stock market remains to be explained.
Conclusions
This study investigates one of the most fundamental aspects of aspect pricing, the comovement of security prices, focusing on the degree to which observed correlations cannot be explained by fundamental factors. It has presented an empirical analysis of excess comovement in a sample of 82 U.S. equity indexes over the interval January 1973 to December 2001. Excess correlation is defined here as the unconditional correlation of the estimated residuals from univariate (OLS) and joint (FGLS) regressions of industry returns on fundamental factors, specifically sector groupings and the three Fama-French factors.
Our analysis shows that lower and upper bounds on the degree of excess absolute correlation are surprisingly high, averaging 0.134 and 0.357, re-spectively, over our entire sample, approximately representing between 31% and 83% of the average raw absolute correlation. Excess comovement is also consistently significant across all industries over the entire time interval. Furthermore, our results suggest that non-fundamental comovement has been playing an increasingly important role in affecting the covariance among stock indexes, especially during the 1990s and the early 2000s.
We also analyzed the determinants of this excess comovement. We find that lower and upper bounds on excess absolute correlation are positively related to market volatility and that lower bound measures are negatively related to the level of the short-term interest rate. Volatility and the riskless rate together explain about 36% of the fluctuations in excess comovement estimated via OLS, but only 22% of the fluctuations in absolute correlation estimated using FGLS residuals. Our evidence offers some support to the theoretical literature that attributes excess comovement to the portfolio rebalancing decisions of investors or to the heterogeneity of their information endowments. In addition, most estimated indicators of excess comovement are symmetric, i.e., not significantly different in rising or falling markets. This evidence suggests that excess comovement does not stem from liquidity shocks. Table 1. Descriptive statistics   This table reports (Panel C) in the months of February to November and in either December or January are equal to zero, under the assumption that the paired differences are independent and normally distributed, with the same mean and either equal or unequal variance.
In the latter case, the t-statistic is computed as t = (x − y) 
